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Panel V: Possible pathways to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations  
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Working Paper by Dr Nick Ritchie, University of York, UK  
Email: nick.ritchie@york.ac.uk 
 
This paper explores pathways for diplomatic responses to the continuing threat of nuclear 
violence. It differentiates between pathways focussed on the devaluing of nuclear weapons by 
the nuclear-armed states and pathways focussed on delegitimising nuclear weapons by a wider 
community of states.  
 
The 2016 Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) was mandated by the UN General Assembly in 
October 2015 ǲǡǳǤ1 
Chair of the 2016 OEWG, Ambassador Thani Thongphakdi, summarised the purpose of the ǣǲ

threat to humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences of any detonation. The risk of these catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences will remain as long as nuclear weapons exist. The increased awareness of and 
well documented presentations on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons compel urgent 
and necessary action by all States leading to a world without nuclear weapons.ǳ2  
 
It followed the 2013 OEWG to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear 
disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear 
weapons. The final report of the 2013 OEWG outlined a series of elements to be considered in 
taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including legally binding 
instruments. The 2013 OEWG was itself a product of the so-called humanitarian initiative on 
nuclear weapons spearheaded by a group of 16 countries at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.3 
The 2013 OEWG final report listed a number of measures, many of which have been developed 
in detail elsewhere alongside other comprehensive blueprints for nuclear disarmament, for 
example the 2009 final report on Eliminating Nuclear Weapons from the International 
Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.  
 
Ireland and Switzerland submitted a working paper to the 2013 OEWG that highlighted four 
possibly ways forward for multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations: 1) a single treaty 
such as a nuclear weapons convention; 2) a series of free-standing agreements built around the 
NPT; 3) a framework convention with protocols; 4) a hybrid of these three.4 The New Agenda 
Coalition developed this sketch further in a working papeǲn the 
                                                           
1 
ǡǲǳǡ
A/C.1/70/L.13/Rev.1, 29 October 2015, New York. 
2 Ambassador Thani Thongphakdiǡǲǯǳ, UN Open-ended Working Group on Taking Forward 
Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, 21 April 2016. 
3 ǡǲ	ǣǳǡ-UNIDIR Vienna 
Conference Series, Paper No. 1, December 2014. Available at <http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-
story-so-far-en-616.pdf>. 
4 ǲǳǡ
submitted by Ireland and Switzerland to the UN Open Ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward 
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear 
weapons, 19 July 2013, A/AC.281/WP.8, Geneva. 
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Non-ǳsubmitted to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee. The 
paper reviewed the outcome of the 2013 OEWG and outlined a set of legal commitments 
essential to any legal instrument that might constitute the NPT Aǯǲǳ
to achieve nuclear disarmament.5 ǲ
practical, technical, legal, financial, administrative and other arrangements required for the ǳǤa modified list of possible 
treaty bodies: 1) a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention; 2) a Nuclear Weapons Ban 
Treaty; 3) a framework arrangement of mutually supporting instruments; and 4) a hybrid ǤǯǤ6  
 
In 2016 UNIDIR and the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI) published a report that 
discussed these options in more detail alongside the so-called step-by-step and Ǯǯ
(parallel and simultaneous steps) approaches that characterise the preferences of many NPT 
nuclear weapon states and US treaty allies. The report labelled these options as: 1) A 
comprehensive approach; 2) a framework approach; 3) a step-by-step approach; and 4) a ban 
treaty approach. The report then discussed in detail the possible scope of a nuclear weapons 
ban treaty in terms of obligations and prohibitions drawing on earlier UNIDIR, ILPI, Article 36 
and Reaching Critical Will reports.7 
 
1. Devaluing nuclear weapons 
Preferences for a particular pathway depend on understandings of the purpose and feasibility of 
next steps towards multilateral nuclear disarmament and the purpose of the humanitarian 
initiative that has precipitated the OEWG discussions. It is useful here to distinguish between a 
purpose of reducing the value of nuclear weapons and a purpose of reducing the legitimacy of 
nuclear weapons. 
 
The post-Cold War nuclear disarmament process has generally focussed on efforts to reduce the 
value assigned to nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed states. Nuclear weapons remain highly 
valued assets for states that possess them and many of their allies. The values assigned to 
nuclear weapons can take different forms, but a value of security through the capacity to 
threaten other societies with nuclear violence is central.  
 
The security values assigned to nuclear weapons have diminished since the end of the Cold War 
as the international social, economic and political landscape has changed, but this has been a 
limited process of what ǮǯǤ 8 This refers to a number of changes 
that have occurred in the nuclear policies of nuclear-armed states, particularly the US and 
                                                           
5 These included: legal prohibitions against the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat 
of use of nuclear weapons; a legally binding obligation to enter into a transparent, irreversible and verifiable process 
of complete nuclear disarmament; provisions for the control of fissile and other nuclear materials relevant to nuclear 
explosive devices; an effective means of verifying the implementation of these obligations and prohibitions, including 
through declarations, inspections, monitoring, cooperation, fact-finding, compliance and dispute-settlement 
mechanisms, etc.; national implementation measures; protection of ǯl 
uses of nuclear technology, subject to safeguards. ǲ-Proliferation ǳ New Agenda Coalition to the Preparatory Conference for 20105 NPT Review 
Conference, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.18, 2 April 2014, p. 8. 
6 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
7 John Borrie, Tim Caughley, Torbjørn Hugo Graff, Magnus Lovøld, Gru Nystuen, and Camilla Waszink, A Prohibition on 
Nuclear Weapons: A Guide to the Issues (Geneva: UNIDIR and ILPI, February 2016); Ray Acheson, Thomas Nash and ǡǲA Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons: Developing a Legal Framework for the Prohibition and ǳǡReaching Critical Will and Article 36, May 2014; 
ǡǲǣǳǡǡǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥ
differentiated yet further. Alyn Ware, for example, outlines seven options: step-by-step; building blocks; nuclear 
weapons convention/hybrid framework; framework agreement; prohibition on use; ban treaty; Global Zero plan. ǡǲ	ǳǡǡǤǡǤǡGlobal Nuclear 
Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 122-144. 
8 ǡǲg and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons,ǳContemporary Security Policy, 34: 1, 2013, pp. 146Ȃ173  
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Russia. They include: a general move away from nuclear defence and towards expeditionary 
conventional warfare; reducing the vast excesses of Cold War legacy nuclear forces; 
marginalising the idea of using nuclear weapons for battlefield Ǯ-ǯ9; shifting some 
roles previously assigned to nuclear weapons to conventional weapons (mainly in the US10); 
and consolidating formal declaratory policies about who might qualify for a nuclear attack and 
under what conditions. A good example of Ǯsurface devaluingǯ is the substantial cuts to US and 
Russian strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons through the reciprocal Presidential 
Nuclear Initiatives in 1991 and 1992. These were very important but they were a pragmatic 
response to geo-political, financial and technical realities rather than a sweeping away of Cold 
War doctrine as some argued.11  
 
All of ǡǤǮǯ
devaluing that require more explicit changes to nuclear doctrines that would restrict the 
practice of nuclear deterrence have been largely rejected. 12 These include measures such as a 
no-first use agreement (proposed initially by China), de-alerting deployed nuclear weapon 
systems, and legally-binding negative security assurances.13 
 
Nevertheless, the NPT nuclear weapon states say this surface devaluing is excellent progress 
and fulfils requirements for meeting their nuclear disarmament responsibilities over the past 
five NPT review cycles from 1990 to 2015. In 2012 they said they had ǲunprecedented ǥǡǡfidence-building and 
transparencǤǳǲnote with satisfaction that stocks of nuclear weapons are now at far lower 
levels than at any time in the past half-ǳǲsystematic and progressive ǳ since the end of the Cold War.14 
 
Focussing nuclear disarmament diplomacy on efforts to reduce the security value assigned to 
nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed states in terms of warhead numbers, types, and doctrine 
does a number of things:  
1) Whilst it might accept that the risk of nuclear violence must be taken seriously, it 
suggests that the problem is not the weapons themselves or the practice of nuclear 
deterrence, but who has them, in what numbers, and how they are configured;  
2) This diagnosis says the risk of nuclear violence can be satisfactorily managed for the 
foreseeable future through adjustments to nuclear posture, doctrine, consolidation of 
nuclear forces, and vigorous counter-proliferation; 
3) It devolves agency for nuclear disarmament to the nuclear-armed states and their 
agendas and relationships; and 
                                                           
9 The US has transitioned from around 9,150 NSNW in 1991 to around 500 today. Russian has gone from around 
18,900 to around 2,000 with several thousand awaiting dismantlement. Data from Table of US Nuclear Warheads, 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C. Available at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab9.asp> 
and Table of USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads, National Resources Defense Council, Washington, D.C. Available at 
<http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab10.asp>. Hans Kristensen and Robert Noǡǲǡ ? ? ? ?ǳǡ
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,  ? ?ǣ ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ? ?Ǣǡǲǡ ? ? ? ?ǳǡ
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68: 2, 2012, pp. 89-90. 
10 See Donald Rumsfeld, Annual report to the President and the Congress, US Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 
2002, chapter 7. 
11 ǲ ?
a unilateral reduction of U.S. armaments. In one stroke, he scrapped much of the now obsolete nuclear doctrine and ǤǳǤHamilton, "The 
President's Arms Control Speech", Congressional Record (Extension of Remarks), 9 October 1991, p. E3331. 
12 ǡǡǲA nuclear-weapons-free world: the need for ǳǡ
Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, 9 June 1998. 
13 ǡǲǣǳǡInternational Affairs, 9: 3, 
2014, pp. 601-623. 
14 Statement by the P5, NPT Preparatory Committee, Gener
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4) It leaves the logic and practice of nuclear deterrence and the legitimacy of nuclear 
weapons relatively undisturbed as far as the nuclear-armed states and their allies are 
concerned. 
 
This is evident when nuclear weapon reductions are accompanied by statements that restate an 
unequivocal commitment to nuclear deterrence and the necessity of nuclear weapons for 
national security and international order. 
 
As the New Agenda Coalition noted i ? ? ? ?
ǣǲ
the NWS to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and 
security concepts and doctrines, nuclear deterrence remains a defining feature of the national 
security postures of both the NWS and the military alliances in which they participate. Such 
developments confirm the continued reliance of NWS on nuclear weapons for their national 
security for the foreseeable future, at the expense of the collective security interests of all.ǳ15  
 
The absence of what many states consider serious movement towards nuclear disarmament 
and a refusal to engage in deep devaluing measures has nurtured disillusionment and cynicism 
over the past twenty years since the permanent extension of the NPT in 1995. It has generated 
deep concern about the creeping permanence of nuclear weapons 70 years into the nuclear age.  
As the Austrian government noted at the 2013 OEWG: ǲǯǥclearly discernible changes in the policies of 
nuclear weapon States and a clear direction towards nuclear disarmament and a world without Ǥǳ16 
 
2. Delegitimising nuclear weapons 
In response, a growing number have states have shifted their focus from devaluing nuclear 
weapons to delegitimising, or stigmatising, nuclear violence. In doing so, they have challenged 
the legitimacy of valuing nuclear weapons at all, irrespective of whether a particular 
government values its weapons or a particular doctrine or operational posture in one way or 
another.  
 
This has been a core purpose of the humanitarian initiative. The Ireland-Switzerland paper to 
the 2013 OEWG, for example, ǲconsider how 
best the non-nuclear-ǳǲ
take forward the case for greater progress on nuclear disarmamentǤǳ17 This was cemented in the ǯ ? ? ? ?ǲǡ
humanitarian consequences and associated risksǳ. The pledge that has now been formally 
endorsed by 127 governments and was adopted as a UN General Assembly resolution in 
December 2015.18 
 
                                                           
15 Working submitted by the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Egypt, New Zealand and South Africa) to 
the UN Open Ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, 
A/AC.281/WP.10, 20 August 2013, p. 2.  
16 ǲǳ
Group to Develop Proposals to Take Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations for the Achievement 
and Maintenance of a World without Nuclear Weapons, 21 May 2013, A/AC.281/WP.1, p.5  
17 ǲǳǡ
submitted by Ireland and Switzerland to the UN Open Ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward 
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear 
weapons, 19 July 2013, A/AC.281/WP.8, Geneva, p. 2. 
18 
ǡǲǳǡ
A/RES/70/48, 7 December 2015. 
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The humanitarian initiative argues that nuclear weapons are illegitimate because of the 
appalling and unacceptable humanitarian consequences of any use under any circumstances.19 
This focus on humanitarian impacts is not a new phenomenon but it has taken on new salience 
as nuclear disarmament processes have slowed and concern at the permanence of nuclear 
weapons has increased. The unacceptability of humanitarian consequences rests on a collective 
moral revulsion and rejection of particular categories of violence, especially massive, inhumane 
and indiscriminate forms of violence. This has been progressively codified in legal rules and 
normative principles governing the conduct of war, in particular international humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflict but also international environmental law and international human 
rights law, in particular the non-derogable right to life.20  
 
These rules and norms have already led international society to stigmatise and prohibit 
chemical and biological weapons, as well as other types of weapons. They have been developed 
in large part over the past century, not least in response to the carnage of the two World Wars. 
They have been crafted by an expanding international society of states after successive waves of 
decolonisation. The legitimacy and authority of these norms and rules rests on their 
universality. According to these norms and rules, and by focusing on what nuclear weapons are 
rather than what purpose they are meant to serve, nuclear weapons are the worst of all because 
of their capacity for massive and indiscriminate violence.21  ? ? ? ?ǲThe 
incalculable human suffering that can be expected to result from any use of nuclear weapons, 
the lack of any adequate humanitarian response capacity and the absolute imperative to 
prevent such use.ǳConsequently, ǲfinds it difficult to envisage how any use of nuclear 
weapons could be compatible with the rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the 
rules of distinction, precaution and proportionality.ǳ22  
 
This is compounded by the permanent risk of nuclear violence as long as nuclear weapons exist. 
The current global nuclear system of interacting national nuclear weapon complexes, fissile 
material production enterprises, command and control systems, nuclear alliances, antagonistic 
relationships involving nuclear-armed states, supplemented by non-state actors with nuclear 
ambitions, carries an inherent systemic risk of the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear war 
planning suggests that nuclear weapons would not be used in ones or twos in a conflict. Instead, 
the decision to escalate a conflict to the use of nuclear weapons would likely involve tens, and 
potentially hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons. The constancy of this risk was 
exemplified in concerns at the prospect of Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump ǮǯǤ23 This highlighted the capacity for individual leaders to 
initiate nuclear conflict at very short notice on an ongoing basis. Daniel Deudney describes this 
concentration of destructive ǮǯǤ 
 
New research has demonstrated the terrible human, environmental and inter-generational 
effects of tens of nuclear warhead detonations, let alone the detonation of hundreds or 
                                                           
19 Nuclear weapons can be used in very low numbers and in circumstances that could conceivably cause only limited 
loss of life, suffering and environmental damage, for example against an enemy flotilla on the high seas. Nevertheless, 
as, Borrie et al (2016, p. 27) note, in negotiations on the Anti-Personnel Land Mine Convention and Convention on 
Cluster Munitions the actual use of these weapons was generally contrary to International Humanitarian Law. As 
such, the point of legally-binding comprehensive prohibition of these weapons ǲall usage, irrespective 
of the (limited) potential for law-ǳǤ  
20 ǡǲǫǳǡAustralian Journal of Peace 
Studies, Vol. 3, 2008, pp. 99-119; Randy RydellǡǲǳNuclear Abolition Forum, No. 1, October 2011. 
21 The extreme and incontestable level of violence that would accompany a nuclear attack is, conversely, a framed as 
source of legitimacy for some advocates of nuclear deterrence insofar as it generates a deterrent effect that induces 
caution and therefore stability and security.  
22 ǮǯǡȀ ? ?Ȁ ?Ǥ ?ǡ
Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Geneva, 26 September 2011, p. 10. 
23 ǡǲǯ	ǫǳǡPolitico, 11 June 2016. 
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thousands. This literature has examined nuclear near misses, the risk of nuclear weapons use, 
and nuclear weapons accidents that undermines the idea of nuclear deterrence as a safe and 
stable system of managing adversarial relations.24 It has studied the gendered impact of nuclear 
weapons in terms of differing effects of ionizing radiation from nuclear detonations on male and 
female bodies and differentiated vulnerabilities after major catastrophes.25 It has produced 
peer-reviewed studies that show a nuclear conflict involving the use of 100 Hiroshima-sized 
nuclear weapons would have a catastrophic impact on the global climate caused by the 
tremendous amount of smoke released into the atmosphere.26 It has also led to new research by 
UNIDIR on the unmanageability of a nuclear detonation in a populated area for the UN-led 
humanitarian response and disaster management system.27 The limits of response are 
exacerbated by a global context of cascading natural disaster, population movements, and 
humanitarian emergencies fueled by climate change with which the international response 
system is already struggling to cope.28 Given that the probability of nuclear use in a nuclear-
armed world remains greater than zero (there is no basis upon which the probability of use can 
be definitively fixed at zero) and given the very grave consequences of use, even a very small 
probability produces a high risk. Given the uniquely destructive effects of nuclear violence, the 
risk of use is widely considered to be unacceptable. 
 
3. Delegitimising nuclear weapons through prohibition 
The legitimacy of a particular practice such as possessing or using nuclear weapons tends to 
rest on four broad factors: legal validity; the justifiability of prevailing rules that permit the 
practice; popular consent; and equality or non-discrimination.29 Delegitimising nuclear 
weapons therefore suggests a set of processes that: 1) undermine claims to legal validity; 2) 
demonstrate withdrawal of consent for practices that legitimise nuclear weapons; 3) highlight 
the discriminatory character of the nuclear weapons control regime under the NPT; and 4) 
challenge the justifiability of the rules that serve as a source of legitimacy for nuclear weapons. 
 
On the last point, the humanitarian initiative challenges the legitimacy of valuing nuclear 
weapons as an essential source of state security by invoking a different set of rules about 
nuclear weapons based on international humanitarian and environmental law. This is a broadly 
cosmopolitan set of rules that says ǲǥ
are advanced in the interests of humanity may have greater ethical force than appeals that are 
                                                           
24 ǡǡÁǡǲ
Nuclear Use ǳǡǡǡ ? ? ? ?ǢEric 
Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Control (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2013); ǡǲǣǳǡ ? ?, October 2014; John ǡǲǣǡǮǯǡǳǡ-UNIDIR Vienna Conference Series 
Paper No. 3, December 2014; ǡǮǫǯǡThe 
Nonproliferation Review, 20: 2, 2013, pp. 361-74. 
25 ǡǡǲ-specific differences in radiation sensitivity Ȃ ǡǳǡ
ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡǡǲDisproportionate Impacts of ǳǡar Information and Resource Service, March 2012. Available at 
<http://www.nirs.org/radiation/radiationharm2pg.pdf>. 
26 	ǡǡǡǲǳǡ
Physics Today, December 2008, pp. 37- ? ?ǢǡǡǡǤǡǤ
ǡǲ
	ǳǡProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
105: 14, 2008, pp. 5307-12. For an overview and further refereǡǲǳǡ-
Proliferation and Disarmament, October 2009. 
27 John Borrie and Tim Caughley, An Illusion of Safety: Challenges of Nuclear Weapon Detonations for United Nations 
Humanitarian Coordination and Response (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2014). 
28 ǡǲǡǳǡThe Observer, 24 April 
2016. 
29 I explore this fǲiǳǡǡǤǡǤViewing 
Nuclear Weapons Through a Humanitarian Lens (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2014). It draws on David Beetham, The 
Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1991) and ǡǲ
the Nuclear Non-ǳǡThe Nonproliferation Review, 13: 2, 2006, pp. 227-252. 
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designed to promote the welfare of any particular nation-state; and the idea that such moral 
commitments should not just influence the conduct of state, international governmental and 
non-ǡǮǯǳǤ30 
David Held argues that tǲ-Second ǳǤ31 
 
An obvious way of maximising the delegitimation of nuclear weapons is therefore through a 
comprehensive, non-discriminatory and unequivocal legal prohibition, one based on an 
alternative set of justifiable rules to govern nuclear weapons rooted in international 
humanitarian law rather than rules that permit the selective possession of nuclear weapons and 
the practice of nuclear deterrence. This would undermine existing claims for the legal validity of Ǥǯ
discriminatory nuclear weapons control regime. It would represent a withdrawal of consent by 
signatory governments for current practices and pathways that are judged to legitimise nuclear 
weapons, though only if it gathered significant majority support. It would also diminish nuclear 
weapons as a Ǯcurrency of powerǯ in the international system.32 
 
Nadǯǲǳǡ
prohibiting piracy and slavery.33 He also notes that these regimes are an innately cosmopolitan 
enterprise in that the moral views underpinning a prohibition are concerned not with how ǲǤǡǮǯicizes and dehumanizes the outsider, as 
evidenced by its capacity to decriminalize violence against individuals during wartime, Ǯǯǡ
emphasising the existence of an internatǳǤ34 
Prohibition regimes tend to be mobilised by transnational moral entrepreneurs that 
successfully reframe a practice as morally unacceptable ǲǳ.35 They tend to reflect a deontological ethical conviction that a particular activity, 
such as torture, is unacceptable, even evil, in and of itself and must be banned irrespective of the 
perceived efficacy or value of the activity.36 
 
A key difference between multilateral disarmament processes that focus on delegitimising 
nuclear weapons and a focus on measures by nuclear-armed states to reduce the value assigned 
to their nuclear weapons, is that the problem for the former is explicitly the weapon rather than 
specific nuclear practices or specific actors. The threat to peace and security in this framing is 
not nuclear proliferation (a term that confines danger to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
additional states or non-state actors) but the existence of the weapons themselves, irrespective 
of the possessor. Nuclear weapons become a collective international liability rather than an 
individual national asset.  
 
                                                           
30 ǡǲ
ǳǡ
ȋȌǡRoutledge Handbook of 
Cosmopolitanism Studies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), p. 60. 
31 ǡǲ

ǣǡ
ǳǡMillennium, 
37: 3, 2009, p. 537. 
32 Anne Harringtonǡǲǣ		ǳǡThe 
Nonproliferation Review, 16: 3, 2009. 
33 ǡǲ
ǣǳǡInternational 
Organization, 44: 4, 1990, p. 480. 
34 Ibid, p. 484. 
35 	ǡǤǡǤǲǳǡInternational Organization, 52: 
4, 1998, p. 888. On reframing see Borrie, J. ǲǳǡ
International Affairs, 90: 3, 2014.  
36 ǡǲǣFraming a Political Consensus on the Unacceptability of ǳǡ-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series Paper No. 2, February 2015. 
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Emphasising the delegitimation of nuclear weapons through a prohibition shifts the direction of 
disarmament diplomacy away from an exclusive focus on trying to change the policies of the 
nuclear-armed states and towards changing the normative international environment in which 
nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed states are embedded. It reorients the locus of power in 
nuclear disarmament diplomacy away from the agency of nuclear-armed states, their 
relationships with each other, and their capacities to resist changes to their nuclear arsenals, 
doctrines and postures. Instead, it empowers a much broader community of states to change the 
international social structure of nuclear legitimacy and illegitimacy and the relationship 
between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states. This is because legitimacy is not 
something an actor can unilaterally claim or insist upon. It is a quality that society collectively ǲǯǡǡǡǯǡǡǳǤ37  
 
Delegitimising nuclear weapons is therefore about challenging the social acceptability of valuing Ǯthe ǯ. It is a process of widening and deepening a collective normative censure of nuclear 
weapons and codifying that censure in a legal form to maximize its authority and normative 
power. It is an approach that acknowledges extant sources of nuclear legitimacy and seeks to 
diminish and disrupt them. It recognises that legitimacy is an attribute ascribed to nuclear 
weapons by international society in which non-nuclear-armed states actively participate and 
can therefore affect through their collective agency. A nuclear weapons prohibition treaty 
would perform that role. It would constitute an unequivocal delegitimation through a legal 
instrument that categorically prohibits the possession or use of nuclear weapons based on 
cosmopolitan principles of unacceptable harm. 
 
The desired political effect is the stigmatisation of nuclear weapons as a means of generating 
change in understandings of acceptable nuclear practices, though this would not be automatic 
or assured. When a society collectively labels a practice (such as the possession and use of 
nuclear weapons) Ǯǯ
behaviour within that society. When illegitimacy is rooted in moral revulsion then that practice 
can become stigmatised. This is a process of separation, one that discriminates between those 
actors that engage in unacceptable behaviour and those that do not.38 Nonconformity is 
punished by shaming, moral opprobrium, sanction, and exclusion insofar as this is possible. A 
stigma constitutes a prohibitionary norm. It cannot prevent perpetration of a prohibited act if 
the means remain available, but it can mobilise and legitimise sustained opposition and restrain 
behaviour. But a stigma also does more than thisǣǯ
they are the sort of actor that accepts or conforms to prohibitionary norms and therefore what 
counts as appropriate behaviour in relation to that identity, or whether they are an actor that 
does not. Stigmas also impose and legitimise a particular version of social reality, i.e. one in Ǯǯimpermissible.39 
 
4. Delegitimising nuclear weapons and the NPT 
From this standpoint, the NPT is problematic because of how it is interpreted by the NPT 
nuclear-weapon states, and this justifies exploring measures outside but complementary to the 
NPT. The NPT formally recognises five states as nuclear weapon states. This has been 
interpreted by NWS as recognition in international law that they, and only they, are permitted 
to possess and deploy nuclear weapons. Their nuclear discourse moves easily from this position 
to the language of entitlement, legal rights, and enduring legitimacy. The NPT therefore 
constitutes a set of rules that legally codify the possession of nuclear weapons for certain states. 
As a result, the NPT is, in fact, unable to unequivocally delegitimise nuclear weapons and the 
                                                           
37 Christian Reus-ǡǲǳǡInternational Politics, 44: 1, 2007, p. 159. 
38 Rebecca Adler-ǡǲǣǡǡǳǡInternational Organization, 68: 1, 2014, pp. 147-176.  
39 ǡǲ
ǳǡInternational Organization, 49: 1, 1995, p. 87. 
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practice of nuclear deterrence given the discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear states 
parties and the political space that discrimination provides for ascribing legitimacy to the 
possession of nuclear weapons for a select few. The legitimacy of nuclear weapons is contested 
under the NPT (and the NPT nuclear-weapon states seem content with that limited 
contestation) but the treaty does not categorically delegitimise nuclear weapons (and the 
nuclear-weapon states would not allow it to).40 
 
The near-universal membership of the treaty adds further legitimacy by providing tacit consent 
for the rules of a global nuclear order that allow for the continued existence of nuclear weapons. 
This was compounded by the consensus decision reached by states parties at the 1995 NPT 
Review and Extension Conference to extend the duration of the treaty indefinitely beyond its 
initial 25-year timeframe. This refreshed the legitimacy of nuclear weapons for the NPT nuclear 
weapon states with a post-Cold War permanence. There are very good reasons for supporting 
the NPT and for its extension in 1995. As John Duncan, ǯ
Arms Control and Disarmament who led the UK delegation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 
observed  ? ? ? ?ǡǲthe NPT remains the foundation stone of international non-proliferation 
architecture. ǯǡǡ
assuredly need to re-invent itǳ.41 That is no doubt true, but the legitimation of the selective 
possession of nuclear weapons through tacit consent is an unfortunate by-product.  
 
Moreover, the legitimation of nuclear weapons for some inside the treaty establishes a set of 
rules that legitimise those same weapons for states outside it. The NPT nuclear-weapon states 
argue that their nuclear weapons are an essential means of ensuring national survival, 
influence, and autonomy in an international system characterised by dangerous and 
irresolvable uncertainty and security competition between states. It is necessary to possess 
nuclear weapons by virtue of being a state in a dangerous inter-state system. However, they 
argue that they, and only they, are allowed to appropriate this logic of nuclear deterrence based ǯon of historical circumstance. Yet this logic as an abstract process of 
strategic reasoning can be objectively applied to and appropriated by any state that feels 
sufficiently threatened by virtue of being a state.  
 
The nuclear weapon states act as if the logic of nuclear deterrence is not applicable to non-
nuclear weapon states because they have accepted the legal designation of non-nuclear weapon 
states. They feel free to extol the supposed virtues of nuclear deterrence seemingly secure in the 
knowledge that this has no adverse persuasive effect on other states because the logic of 
nuclear deterrence cannot be appropriated by them. The problem is that extolling the virtues of 
nuclear deterrence does have a persuasive effect precisely because the logic is universally 
applicable on its own strategic political-military terms, demonstrated by its appropriation by 
India, Pakistan, North Korea and more surreptitiously by Israel. Non-nuclear weapon states 
recognise the logical destination of the non-discriminatory application of this logic is a world of 
many nuclear-armed states with all the risks of nuclear violence this entails.42 It was just such a 
prospect that motivated states to negotiate the NPT in the 1960s. As UN High Representative for 
Disarmament Affairs, Angela ǡ ? ? ? ?ǣǲf nuclear-weapon States continue to 
impose conditionsȄsuch as the need to retain a nuclear deterrent until global conditions are 
safer and strategic stability is ensured before engaging in good faith multilateral disarmament 
negotiationsȄthen they must accept that other states will also accept the false logic of this 
                                                           
40 ǲǳǡǤǡǤȋȌViewing 
Nuclear Weapons Through a Humanitarian Lens (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2013). 
41 ǡǲ
 ? ? ? ?-ǳǡ 28 April 2008, 
United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament, Vienna. 
42 On the logic of nuclear deterrence carried to its logical conclusion see Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons: More May Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). 
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security chimera. The risk of proliferation grows every additional day that states insist the 
doctrine of nuclear deterrence is essential for their security.ǳ43  
 
5. Prohibition vs. regulation or prohibition and regulation? 
Based on the foregoing, one can differentiate between two broad approaches to nuclear 
disarmament negotiations: First, a disarmament process guided by the subjective assessments 
of the nuclear-armed states about the relative value of their nuclear weapons in different and 
evolving security contexts. Second, a process that delegitimises nuclear weapons by 
undermining the legitimacy of valuing them irrespective of their perceived utility by possessor 
states.  
 
Advocates of a Ǯstep-by-stepǯ and Ǯbuilding blocksǯ approach to nuclear disarmament privilege 
the first approach. In doing so, they have suggested that a new legal instrument to prohibit 
nuclear weapons is either an unnecessary distraction from other important measures such as a 
Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty, a diplomatic insurgency that will imperil the NPT, or a 
deliberately divisive, exclusive and therefore invalid diplomatic process.44 Nothing about a 
prohibition is incompatible with a step-by-step or buildings blocks approach. It is not exclusive 
or in tension with the NPT as whole. A prohibition and other important measures such as entry 
into force of the CTBT, negotiation of an FM(C)T, nuclear stockpile reductions, de-alerting, 
nuclear disǡǮǯ
exclusive. Political work is required on both physical constraints (on stockpiles, testing, fissile 
material production, deployments) and normative and legal constraints (on declaratory policy, 
use, possession).  
 
A prohibition would inevitably establish a firm connection with the NPT by rooting its 
legitimacy in part on the Article VI commitment to pursue negotiations on effective measures 
relating to nuclear disarmament. There does not appear to be any need, desire or intent to set a 
prohibition against the NPT but rather as a de facto extension of it. In that way it would support 
and advance the NPT as a nuclear weapons control regime just as other NPT-related 
agreements have done, such as the CTBT, IAEA Additional Protocol, New START, and nuclear 
weapon-Ǥ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǣǲEmbarking on a process to 
develop a treaty banning nuclear weapons would not preclude work continuing on other 
aspects of the established disarmament and arms control agenda such as a fissile material ban 
treaty or work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Indeed, negotiations on a treaty 
banning nuclear weapons could even help to unlock some of the impasses that have appeared so 
intractable in the recent past by motivating states to take action and demonstrating that Ǥǳ45 
 
Focussing on delegitimising nuclear weapons does not diminish the importance of efforts to 
reduce nuclear stockpiles and change nuclear doctrinesǡǲǳ-armed. Delegitimising nuclear weapons would certainly ǮǯǮǯǡ point, but it is 
not incompatible with them. Arguments about mutual exclusivity seem to mask a deeper 
opposition to the delegitimation of nuclear weapons because those weapons and the practice of 
nuclear deterrence are accepted as legitimate. It is resistance to a process of delegitimation that 
appears to have led nuclear weapon states to largely exclude themselves from the humanitarian 
impact of nuclear weapons conferences and the 2013 and 2016 OEWGs. As noted above, a ban 
                                                           
43 ǡǲǣ
 ? ? ? ?ǳǡ
Annecy, France, 13 March 2015.  
44 ǡǡǲǮ
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Canada to the 2016 UN Open Ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament 
Negotiations, Geneva, A/AC.286/WP.20/Rev.1, 27 April 2016. 
45 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ǣǳǡǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥ 
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treaty would clearly challenge the discourses and practices that use the NPT to legitimise 
nuclear weapons but it would not challenge the NPT itself. It would, in effect, recognise the 
inability of the NPT to categorically delegitimise nuclear weapons and provide an appropriate 
solution that would constitute ǲǳits Article VI. 
 ǲǳ
despite the absence of any appreciable movement on these steps for many years.46 A ban treaty 
would be a concrete and practical step Ȃ not a panacea, which no one claims, but an important 
step. Advocates of a building blocks approach urge other states to take into account the 
prevailing international environment. The so-called humanitarian initiative seems to have taken 
the prevailing international environment into account, found it wanting, and sought to change it 
through concrete and practical steps to delegitimise nuclear weapons.  
 
With that in mind, the OEWG and its community of participating states does face a choice. It is a 
choice defined by preferred pathways for social change rather than one discrete step over 
another. If the preference of states is to privilege limited Ǯǯ
measures by the nuclear-armed states, to privilege their disarmament agency and therefore 
their disarmament agenda as the outcome of this working group, then a step-by-step or building 
blocks process is likely the most appropriate approach despite the lack of discernible progress. 
If the preference is to privilege delegitimising nuclear weapons, then a prohibition process of 
some form catalysed by the collective agency of the non-nuclear armed is likely the most 
appropriate approach.  
 
 
6. Ǯ-ǯ for legal prohibition? 
The UNIDIR-ILPI study mentioned at the outset has explored elements of a legal prohibition. 
Reports by Reaching Critical Will and Article 36 have elaborated possible principles and 
obligations of a specific ban treaty. These elements have also been catalogued in working papers 
submitted by states to the 2016 OEWG.47 There is no need to repeat their analysis here. 
However, it is important to think through the relationship between a ban treaty, a framework 
agreement, and the NPT in the context of the foregoing on delegitimising nuclear weapons. 
 
Prioritising the delegitimation of nuclear weapons privileges a prohibition-then-elimination 
over an elimination-then-prohibition pathway for multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations. Of the four options outlined in the UNIDIR-ILPI study (comprehensive, step-by-
step, framework, and ban treaty), a ban treaty with or without nuclear-armed states would be 
the most unequivocal legal instrument for delegitimising and stigmatising the possession of 
nuclear weapons based on the unacceptable humanitarian impact of their use. As Costa Rica and 
Malaysia argue in their working paper: ǲ-
personnel landmines suggests that even a treaty with limited membership and little content 
beyond a straightforward prohibition could be highly effective in developing and strengthening 
norms against nuclear weapons. The fact that some nuclear-armed States explicitly oppose such 
a treaty is further evidence of its likely effectiveness as a means of norm-building.ǳ48 
Nevertheless, as noted above, an authoritative and therefore effective prohibition regime will 
                                                           
46 John Borrie and Tim ǡǲǣǳǡ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Ǥ ?ǡ
ǡ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ǣrspective of nuclear-weapon-ǳǡǡǡǡ
ǡǡǡ
to the 2016 UN Open Ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations, 
Geneva, ȀǤ ? ? ?ȀǤ ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ǣ ? ?ǡǲǯ ǯǳǡ
briefing paper, January 2015. 
48 ǲǳ
by Costa Rica and Malaysia to the 2016 UN Open Ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear 
Disarmament Negotiations, Geneva, A/AC.286/WP.13, 26 February 2016, p. 4. 
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need to be legally binding, rest on justifiable rules (in this case cosmopolitan principles of 
acceptable state behaviour towards individuals and other states), be comprehensive and non-
discriminatory, and enjoy popular consent evidenced in a significant number of signatories. 
 
Questions arise on verifying the legal obligations of a nuclear-armed state that decided to 
accede to a ban treaty.49 There are many challenges associated with effective verification of the 
dismantlement and disposition of nuclear warheads and components. These would need to be 
addressed and codified through a further instrument most likely in close collaboration with the 
IAEA. This could take the form of a verification protocol to a ban treaty, which opens the 
possibility of effecting a legally-binding prohibition on nuclear weapons through a framework 
convention-protocol approach.  
 
The idea of a framework has been invoked in a number of recent analyses as well as NPT and 
OEWG working papers.50 Ǯǯ
next steps on nuclear disarmament, but it is worth entertaining a particular form Ȃ the 
framework convention-protocol model. Framework conventions are generally supplemented by 
substantive protocols. The expectation is that the convention establishes broad commitments 
and objectives and a general governance framework for an issue area with more substantive 
obligations negotiated through protocols to the parent instrument. In doing so it establishes 
general guidelines and principles rather than substantive regulation. This can make framework 
conventions a flexible and adaptive instrument for structuring an issue in order to realise a 
specific set of political and technical objectives, which can be open-ended or time-bound.51 The 
limited substantive commitments in the parent framework can also serve to widen 
participation. The framework approach also allows for discussions to commence without 
waiting for consensus and allows for the postponement of substantive negotiations if consensus 
cannot be achieved without sacrificing the basic principles and objectives embodied in the 
framework.52 ǡǲjoin framework conventions because they do 
not entail significant commitments but they can take on a momentum of their own and become 
focal points for forums for discussion, international public opinion, negotiation, and confidence ǳǤ53  
 
Framework conventions have primarily been used in the field of International Environmental 
Law, including the the 1979 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea 
Against Pollution under the auspices of UN Environmental Programme, the 1985 Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer with its 1987 Montreal Protocol, the 1989 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, and the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 
Other examples include the 2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and its 2010 
Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and the 1980 Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons and its five protocols, the first three of which were adopted with the 
convention.  
 
There are many variations on this theme. Most framework conventions include a statement of 
objectives, guiding principles, basic obligations, and national measures. They often establish 
                                                           
49 See Torbjorn 
ǡǲǣǳǡ
Policy Institute, Olso, 2013, p. 8. 
50 ǡǲǣOptions for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and 
Implementation of NPǳǡ-UNIDIR NPT Review Conference Series Paper No. 3, February 2015. 
51 Ǥǡ
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ǡǤǡǲ	ǫǳǡ
Environmental Law Institute Analysis, 36, 2006, p. 2. 
52 Nele Matz-ǡǲ	ǳǡGoettingen Journal of International Law, 1: 3, 2009, 
pp. 439-458. 
53 ǡǲ	Ȁǳǡ	
Technical Briefing Series No. 1, WHO/NCD/TFI/99.1, World Health Organisation, 1999, p. 18. 
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permanent institutions to provide ongoing governance of the issue area.54 This can include a 
secretariat to administer the convention and monitor compliance, a plenary decision-making 
body in the form of a Conference of the Parties (COP) or Meeting of the Parties (MOP), and 
financial mechanisms to assist implementation.55 They also include mechanisms to review 
implementation, promote compliance, resolve disputes, and specify processes for adopting 
additional specific commitments through protocols. Protocols can be comprehensive or specific 
according to the needs of the convention, its objectives and core principles.56 
 
Most framework conventions also involve processes for generating and sharing data on an 
issue. This can involve experts from governments, industry, academia, research institutes, and 
NGOs. Framework conventions can establish scientific advisory bodies to generate, analyse and 
peer review data and facilitate scientific cooperation. They can also involve national reporting 
requirements and national regulatory measures as well as education, training and public 
awareness programmes.57  
 
Framework conventions can specify the protocols that will have to be negotiated. Sometimes 
protocols are negotiated in parallel with the convention and adopted concurrently. Some are 
negotiated subsequently, although there is no guarantee that anticipated protocols will be 
negotiated at all. Some have mandatory protocols, whilst others are optional. The 1973 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (the MARPOL) and its 1978 Protocol 
negotiated under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation, for example, has six 
comprehensive annexes, two of which are compulsory.58 Entry into force requirements for 
protocols can also vary. For example, Article 15 of the UNFCCC states that the Conference of 
Parties (COP) may adopt an amendment/protocol to the Convention (other than an annex) by a 
threeǦquarters majority vote if consensus cannot be reached. Once in force, an amendment 
binds only those parties that have accepted it, and applies only as between those parties. A 
series of amendments can sometimes be packaged together and adopted as a single instrument 
to prevent a la carte accession.59  
 
In some cases a framework convention does include specific obligations and substantive 
regulation in the parent agreement leaving much less to specify in subsequent protocols, such as 
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and its 2003 Cartagena Protocol and 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol.60 Others, such as the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, provide significant latitude for state implementation of legally binding guidance for Ǥǲ
objectives and main principles while allowing each party sufficient room to take national ǥǤǳ61 
 
Framework conventions and protocols can also establish working groups to consider further 
measures to fulfǯ. For example, the 
2005 Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWGǦKP) was established to consider Annex I commitments beyond the initial 
commitment period up to 2012.62 A standalone ban treaty could include many of these 
                                                           
54 ǡǲ	Ȁ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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functions. It could establish a secretariat, Conference of the Parties, financial mechanisms for 
implementation assistance, data generation and information sharing, national reporting 
measures, and national regulatory requirements. Such measures would address what a number 
of states consider shortcomings with the NPT, in particular the absence of a secretariat, 
obligatory reporting, and a culture of accountability and transparency. It could establish law-
making processes for adopting protocols and establishing additional institutions, notably on 
verification but also on additional complementary measures such as divestment from entities 
engaged in nuclear weapons development and support.63 
 
Where a framework approach differs is in the potential to provide a general governance 
framework for nuclear disarmament based on core principles and objectives. These principles ǲǳ
to nuclear disarmament beyond a prohibition and thereby constitute a more comprehensive ǯǤǯ 
principles and objectives and Article VI obligation to pursue and conclude nuclear disarmament 
negotiations. There is a substantial institutionalised governance framework for nuclear non-
proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but governance for the process of nuclear 
disarmament is less deǤǯ
nuclear proliferation and its codification in a range of legal instruments, compared to its weaker 
norm of expectation of progress towards nuclear disarmament that is subject to far less legal 
codification (nuclear weapon-free zone treaties and the legal and technical modalities of US-
Russia nuclear arms reduction and elimination being important constituent parts). 
 
A framework approach could therefore be attractive, but it would need to Ǯ-ǯ
framework. It would need to include either specific prohibition obligations and substantive 
associated commitments in the parent agreement rather than the more usual general 
guidelines, or a general framework together with a mandatory prohibition protocol negotiated 
in parallel and adopted concurrently. A framework approach that did not incorporate a 
prohibition from the outset would risk diluting the delegitimation of nuclear weapons as a core 
purpose. It would risk codifying a set of open-ended disarmament aspirations similar to those  ? ? ? ?Ǯ ? ?ǯ ? ? ? ? ? ?-point Action Plan that have to date been largely 
ineffective.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons was born out of the exasperation of a small 
coalition of states, inter-governmental organisations, and civil society groups with the slow pace 
of nuclear disarmament, the continuing dangers of a nuclear-armed world, and a seemingly 
implacable commitment to the logic of nuclear deterrence by the nuclear-armed. The initiative 
rapidly gained impressive momentum and support from 2010. Its core theme of delegitimising 
nuclear weapons has coalesced around the idea of a nuclear ban treaty. Nuclear disarmament 
diploǮǯǣ-
by-step or building blocks that cedes disarmament agency to the nuclear-armed, or twist and 
pursue a pathway of delegitimation alongside other traditional steps. Momentum is building for Ǯǯnuclear weapons and nuclear 
violence and thereby precipitate change in the nuclear policies and practices of the nuclear-
armed and their nuclear supporters, change that otherwise does not seem forthcoming. 
 
The purpose of a delegitimising strategy appears to be to ǲǳfor the 
possession of nuclear weapons through stigmatisation that could prompt behavioural 
adjustment over a period of time. Chris Reus-Smit defines this thus: ǲ
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experiences a crisis of legitimacy, it is argued, when the level of social recognition that its 
identity, interests, practices, norms, or procedures are rightful declines to the point where it 
must either adapt (by reconstituting or recalibrating the social bases of its legitimacy, or by ȌǤǳ64 
Non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society organisations are looking for adaptation by 
nuclear-armed states to an evolving normative consensus in which the legitimacy of nuclear 
violence has been extinguished, or at least greatly diminished; one in which the costs and 
challenges of sustaining the legitimacy of nuclear weapons becomes increasingly problematic. 
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